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Beyond All Criticism?
Daniel A. Farbert & Suzanna Sherrytt
INTRODUCTION
We knew, of course, that we were treading on dangerous
ground in challenging radical multiculturalism. In writing
Beyond All Reason' we argued that the radicals' postmodern
theories conflict deeply with their own laudable goals of racial
justice and progressive dialogue. In particular, we tried to
show that these theories had anti-Semitic and anti-Asian
implications, and that they undermined community and
impeded dialogue.
In this way, we hoped to persuade the radicals to abandon
these theories in favor of alternative methods of fighting for
their goals. Of course, life is never that simple. Unfazed by
our claims, the radicals have leveled a barrage of charges, both
in this symposium and in a number of earlier reviews in other
academic journals. The two most important charges are that
we distorted the radicals' positions, and that we made
illegitimate consequentialist arguments based on the very
identity politics we decry. We deal with these charges in the
next two sections of this essay. A third section shows that the
responses to Beyond All Reason often illustrate the very
dangers we originally wrote about, especially the risk of undert Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Faculty,
University of Minnesota (emaih farbe001@tc.umn.edu).
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mining dialogue and community. In general, the radicals'
responses to Beyond All Reason resort to the self-sealing
ideology we described in the book: radical multiculturalists
seem to view their scholarship as beyond all criticism.
Before we turn to those topics, a few words are in order
about two other reactions to the book. Some reviewers chided
us for our choice of topics, wishing we had instead analyzed the
philosophical underpinnings of radical multiculturalism. 2
Others read us as accusing the theorists themselves of antiSemitism-as putting anti-Semitic words in their mouthsrather than simply pointing out the anti-Semitic implications
of the theories. 3 As to the first, we certainly agree that a philo2. See Francis J. Mootz III, Between Truth and Provocation:Reclaiming
Reason in American Legal Scholarship, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 605, 613-20
(1998); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Truth or Consequences? The Inadequacy of
Consequentialist Arguments Against Multicultural Relativism, 15 CONST.
COMM. 185, 186-87 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone: Race and White
Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1642 (1999) ("I do not think you can read
what I or other critical race theorists have done as being an effort to represent
the communities of color in conflict with the Jewish communities."); John 0.
Calmore, Random Notes of an IntegrationWarrior-Part2: A CriticalResponse
to the Hegemonic "Truth" of Daniel Farberand Suzanna Sherry, 83 MINN. L.
REV. 1589, 1603 (1999) [hereinafter Calmore, Random Notes-Part2] ("Farber
and Sherry claim that critical race theory has reduced achievement by Jews to
a function of illegitimate power only. Of course, critical race theory, as a body
of scholarship, makes no such claim."); id. at 1605 ("Farber and Sherry make
an incredible claim that critical race theorists... implicitly endorse racism.");
Nancy Levit, Critical of Race Theory: Race, Reason, Merit and Civility, 87
GEO. L.J. 795, 807 (1999) ("Farber and Sherry do not cite to any critical race,
feminist, or gay legal theories actually scapegoating Asians or Jews.");
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Book of Manners: How To Conduct a Conversation
on Race-Standing, Imperial Scholarship, and Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 1051,
1057 (1998) (anti-Semitism is "[a] curious charge, since I don't know anyone in
the crit camp who would say those things .... Farber and Sherry put words
in our mouths, then take us to task for what they think we must be saying");
id. at 1063 ("[To accuse us of harboring unspoken thoughts about Jews' illgotten gains is unfair."); id. at 1062 ("Farber and Sherry... accuse us of
latent antisemitism. ... ."); Mootz, supra note 2, at 613 n.34 ("In some
instances.., they have been unfair to their targets, as when they suggest
that the radicals would assert that a book denying the Holocaust is as good as
a book that accurately reports the fact of the death camps."); John 0.
Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration Warrior, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1441,
1469 (1997) [hereinafter Random Notes] ("[M]y alleged anti-Semitism
apparently boils down to linking Jews to white people .
").
Not all of our critics have missed our point in this way. See Daria
Roithmayr, Guerrillas in Our Midst: The Assault on Radicals in American
Law, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1658, 1675 (1998) ("[Ihe authors do not argue that
radical theorists are engaging in Holocaust denial or advocating totalitarianism" but only "claim that the radicals' denial of objective truth can be
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sophical critique of radical multiculturalism is a worthwhile
project, but it was not our project. Indeed, at least one reviewer
has done a rather good job on that project himself, demonstrating that "the foundational premises of radical multiculturalism
are deeply confused." 4
As to the second critique-that we are accusing radical
multiculturalists personally of being anti-Semites-we can
only repeat what we said in the book: "We do not accuse radical
multiculturalists of harboring even covert animosity toward
Jews or Asians."5 As we discuss in more detail in Part 11, we
find it odd that scholars who are adept at recognizing the
unconscious racist implications of all sorts of social and legal
structures have trouble distinguishing a critique of theoretical
structures from an attack on individual theorists. Perhaps
that, too, is a consequence of radical multiculturalism: the
combination of identity politics and social constructionism
makes it difficult to distinguish the scholar from the scholarship.
Finally, we note that although most of our reviewers have
focused primarily on critical race theory, Beyond All Reason
took both a broader and a narrower approach. Many critical
race theorists are not radical multiculturalists, and many
radical multiculturalists are not critical race theorists. Following the lead of our reviewers, however, we focus in this
response primarily (but not exclusively) on the radical multiculturalist wing of critical race theory.
I. FIGHT OR FLIGHT
Humans, like many other animals, have two instinctive
reactions to an attack: fight or flight. In this section, we
suggest that most of our critics have responded with one of
these reactions: either they attack us or they back off from
some of their most radical statements, insisting that we
misunderstood them. Unfortunately, as sometimes in nature,
the "fight" here seems to be mostly bravado, and the "flight"
just backs them deeper into a corner. Noticeably absent from
most replies to our work is any solid defense of the position the
radical multiculturalists originally staked out, or any cogent
reply to the questions we posed.
misused in nihilistic fashion.").
4. Hills, supra note 2, at 198.
5. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 9.
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A. FIGHT (OR: IF ALL ELSE FAILS, CALL THEM NAMES)
Rather than confronting our arguments on the merits,
some substitute invective for analysis. They call us racists and
lump us in with every other "enemy" they can imagine, from
the most unthinkingly conservative politicians to the most
thoughtful academics and judges.
The insults flow freely in the law reviews: We are "engagement" racists, 6 and our book is "an expression of cultural
racism," 7 "[w]ritten to appease the conservative thirst to smite
the infidels who have gathered in the temples" 8-and there is
only "a thin line" between our modem racism and "the oldfashioned racism of naked white supremacy." 9 We have
"practically [made] a career out of minority-bashing."1 0 We are
"simply among those who are fighting back on behalf of white
supremacy, power, and privilege,"11 and indeed we are both
said to be "white male[s]." 12 We are also-by implication,
although not specifically named--"[s]toryhaters" who "wouldn't
know what [autobiography] was if somebody told it to [our]
faces," because we were "[r]aised in an overly obsessive,
objectively neutralized cultural style" by "upper class parents
[with] money, a home in the burbs, and nice kids who were
going to go on from their fancy grade schools and college
preparatory gigs to Harvard/Stanford/Yale." 13 Our favorite,

6. Calmore, Random Notes-Part2, supra note 3, at 1606.
7. Id. at 1609.
8. Culp, supra note 3, at 1655.
9. Calmore, Random Notes-Part2, supra note 3, at 1613.
10. Delgado, supra note 3, at 1061. Having issued this charge of
opportunism through the mouth of one of his fictional alter egos, Delgado then
downplays it in the next sentence. One of the great advantages of storytelling
is that it allows the author to avoid full responsibility for any of the views
expressed in his own works.
11. Calmore, Random Notes-Part2, supra note 3, at 1597.
12. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Telling a Black Legal Story: Privilege,
Authenticity, "Blunders,"and Transformationin OutsiderNarratives,82 VA. L.
REV. 69, 90 & n.72 (1996) (describing a "white male" backlash against outsider
scholarship, and citing only articles by Farber, Sherry, and our colleague Jim
Chen-a Taiwanese native who moved to the United States at the age of 6).
13. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race
Practice,95 MICH. L. REV. 741, 741 (1997). Suffice it to say that neither of us
fits this stereotype, and that if we were to characterize critical race theorists
in such a blatantly stereotypical way the accusations of racism would at least
treble in volume.
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however, is that we are "secret agents of a very right-wing
racial project."'14
John Calmore, in particular, levels a barrage of epithets.
He questions our good faith.15 He says that we lack "basic prin16
ciples of decency and of scholarly and journalistic integrity,"
7
and that we exhibit "a more general disrespect and contempt"'
for blacks-all the while applauding himself for his own "high
level of civility."'18 As we discuss in part III, this rhetoric simply
confirms our original claim that radical multiculturalism impedes dialogue.
The radicals also seem unable to distinguish among the
various people with whom they disagree. Jerome McCristal
Culp claims that "there is very little difference on the race
question between Newt Gingrich and Farber and Sherry."'19 He
also explicitly groups us with Judge Richard Posner and then
accuses Posner of "racist acts" and "unexamined racism."20
Calmore places us "in the bad company" of "Stephen and Abigail
Thernstrom, Dinesh D'Souza, and Jim Sleeper"2 1-a laundry list
of people he disagrees with, including serious scholars and
social commentators as well as a deliberate provocateur.
Both Culp and Calmore assume that since we disagree
with them, we must side with everyone else who disagrees with
them. Calmore, for example, assumes that we, like other
"[miodern racists" implicitly endorse four racist principles: that
"[discrimination is a thing of the past," that "[bilacks are
pushing too hard, too fast, and into places where they are not
wanted," that "[t]hese tactics and demands are unfair," and
that "recent gains are undeserved."22 His only evidence of this
is that we find the premises of critical race theory inconsistent
with its own goals-goals which we quite explicitly endorse. 23
14. Calmore, Random Notes-Part2, supra note 3, at 1605.
15. See id. at 1617.
16. Id. at 1592.
17. Id. at 1591.
18. Calmore, Random Notes, supra note 3, at 1457.
19. Culp, supra note 3, at 1642.
20. Id. at 1643 n.13, 1659-60.
21. Calmore, Random Notes-Part2, supra note 3, at 1608.
22. Id. at 1607.
23. See FARBER AND SHERRY, supra note 1, at 7. Our effort to find
common ground with critical race theory was duly noted and attacked by some
conservative reviewers. See Heather MacDonald, Storytellers, COMMENTARY,
Oct. 1997, at 65; Mark Miller, Professor,Tell Us a Story, NATIONAL REvIEW,
Dec. 8, 1997, at 53.

1740

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1735

Culp assumes that because we criticize radical multiculturalism, we must be in favor of the legal and social status quo: "In
the world of Farber and Sherry our job as law professors is to
celebrate the Supreme Court's greatness and criticize only at
the margins," because "the heart of [their] practical reason is
simply that the status quo is good."24
These accusations of racism and bad company ultimately
stem from the identity politics that is at the core of radical
multiculturalism. The radicals seem unable to separate critiques of their theories from attacks on themselves. Calmore
says that he takes our critique "personally, not so much as a
critical race theorist, but, rather, as a black person" because he
sees it as "related to, not distinct from, a more general disrespect and contempt for the African-American community,
scholarly and otherwise." 25 He expresses incredulity at our
"subtle distinction" in accusing the theory, and not the theorists,
26
of anti-Semitism.
A good illustration of the radical blurring of the distinction
between intellectual disagreement and personal racism is
Calmore's attack on one of our other reviewers. That reviewer,
Michael Skube, praised Beyond All Reason in the pages of the
Atlanta Journal-Constitution.Calmore quotes Skube's critique
of critical race theory at length, adding italics and a sarcastic
parenthetical comment. As recast by Calmore, Skube's passage
reads as follows:
Farber and Sherry's book [is] "an overdue criticism of intellectual
imposters who once were a lunatic fringe but now lay siege to the
most basic tenets of the Western Enlightenment".... These scholars,
in [Skube's] view, are "[ciourted and attended to by the best
universities, they retail absurdities that haven't the remotest
connection to jurisprudence but get disproportionate play in law
reviews".... He concludes his review by stating- "When truth no
longer matters, everything else falls by the wayside with it, and
barbarismwins out." (I am not sure if it is progress for blacks to be
characterized as "barbaric" rather than "savage." What do you
think?)... Skube picks up their charge of anti-Semitism: "The
Holocaust matters because it did happen, not because someone
imagined it. Yet there are those who deny anything unusual was
going on in those ovens.27 Would Patricia Williams say it isn't so
important? You wonder."

24. Culp, supra note 3, at 1666, 1669.
25. Calmore, Random Notes-Part2, supra note 3, at 1591.
26. Calmore, Random Notes, supra note 3, at 1461.
27. Calmore, Random Notes-Part 2, supra note 3, at 1611 (citations
omitted, italics and parenthetical commentary supplied by Calmore).
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Calmore claims that this is "libelous" and "anti-black, racist

babble."28 Intemperate, perhaps; colorful and provocative,
certainly; but libelous and racist? It makes us wonder what he
thinks of Matthew Finkin's careful analysis of the theoretical
29
affinities between radical multiculturalism and Fascism.
Presumably Finkin, too, is a racist, as is Stephen Holmes, who
has written more generally of the Fascist roots of anti-liberal
philosophies. 30 Indeed, one must wonder whether any critique
of radical multiculturalism could escape such accusations.
Such responses do not bode well for dialogue.
B. FLIGHT (OR: "WE DIDN'T REALLY MEAN THAT")
Another common reaction to our book is to claim that we
have distorted the radicals' views by using "abbreviated quotations,"31 "snippets,"32 and "punch lines only,"33 "divorced from
context. 34 Several authors thus try to explain what they (or
others) really meant, often providing long quotations for added
context.35 In fact, these explanations fail on three different
levels.
1. Adding Context Doesn't Reveal a Different Meaning
Some of the disclaimers are simply unconvincing as a
matter of textual interpretation. For example, Culp tries to
argue that Derrick Bell's Space Traders story did not mean to
question Jewish commitment to racial justice, but only to
suggest that "such concern by Jews and other supportive whites
has not been enough to eliminate racism."36 But Bell's story
28. Id.
29. See Matthew W. Finkin, QUATSCH!, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1681, 1693-1703
(1999).
30. See STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM (1993).

31. Kathryn Abrams, How To Have a Culture War, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
1091, 1100 (1998).
32. Delgado, supra note 3, at 1069.
33. Roithmayr, supra note 3, at 1661.
34. Delgado, supra note 3, at 1054. Matthew Finkin, on the other hand,
considers our description to be a "fully fledged account," suggesting that
claims of distortion are equivalent to claims that "Wagner's music really is
much better than it sounds." Finkin, supra note 29, at 1682; see also Hills,
supra note 2, at 186 (the book is "scrupulously honest" in its quotations).
35. Of course, given space limitations, they can only focus on a few
selected quotations, leaving most of our excerpts untouched. But even as to
the alleged distortions, as we show in the text, their charges are unfounded.
36. Culp, supra note 3, at 1646.
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specifically attributes to "many" Jews a "concern... not
contained in their official condemnation of the Trade offer":
"that, in the absence of blacks, Jews could become...
scapegoats."37 Bell's obvious point is not just that Jewish
support won't stop the deal but that the purported Jewish
commitment to racial justice is at least tempered by-if not
largely motivated by-a covert desire to keep blacks as
scapegoats. Culp's reading simply ignores Bell's language.
Similarly, Culp suggests that Bell's treatment of Louis
Farrakhan is only meant to reject the position that all blacks
must disavow Farrakhan 38 -certainly a fair argument, but not
the one Bell seems to be making. In the same passage in which
he discusses Farrakhan's anti-Semitic remarks, Bell says,
among other things, that Farrakhan merely "forthrightly
charges with evil those who do evil." 39 What makes Bell's view
of Farrakhan noteworthy is the coupling of a fervent approval of
Farrakhan's overall message with an insistence on dismissing
any concerns about Farrakhan's anti-Semitism.
Culp also claims that we misunderstood his own work
when we took his description of "black men in white face" as a
disparaging label. Culp argues that he is "ambivalen[t]" about
assimilation, and that his use of the phrase is meant only to
express that ambivalence. 40 This is an unlikely interpretation:
the whole point of the metaphor seems to be that assimilated
blacks are as inauthentic as whites wearing blackface, an
image highly offensive to modern sensibilities. To support his
more recent interpretation, Culp provides a long quote from
one of his earlier articles:
This requirement of black assimilation is akin to a requirement that
black people put on white face and is ultimately unacceptable as a
goal for a decolonized African American community. This desire for
assimilation promotes the conclusion that it is permissible to create
37. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMAN-

ENCE OF RACISM 186-87 (1992).
38. See Culp, supra note 3, at 1647. Interestingly, John Calmore
demands that we disavow at least one of the reviewers of our book as racist,
although that review does not begin to approach Farrakhan's direct attacks.
See Calmore, Random Notes-Part2, supra note 3, at 1611. Farrakhan has,
among other things, called Judaism a gutter religion. Our reviewer simply
raises serious questions about the validity of radical multicultural arguments.
Calmore apparently takes the attack personally, which is part of the problem
with radical multiculturalism. See id. at 1591.
39. BELL, supranote 37, at 125, quoted in FARBER & SHERRY, supranote 1,
at 44.
40. Culp, supra note 3, at 1648.
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or in
white culture but dangerous to have black culture on campuses
4
the curriculum because it will politicize our universities. '

If this is ambivalence, not critique, just what would constitute
an attack on assimilated blacks? Perhaps Bell's likening of the
nomination of Justice Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court
to "the slave masters' practice of elevating to overseer.., those
slaves willing to mimic the masters' views" 42 (a comment which
Culp also defends as merely a comment about Thomas's
"modest credentials" 43).
Kathryn Abrams also charges us with quoting her
misleadingly and out of context. Like most of our other critics,
she admits that she wrote the quoted language,44 which was
that "she 'would not be particularly disturbed' if a narrative
purporting to be nonfiction turned out not to 'track the life
experiences of [its] narrato[r] in all particulars.'" 45 But in
context, she claims, this statement only applies to some
supposedly nonfiction narratives-those that portray suffering
from the perspective of "the 'expert' insights of an 'insider"
rather than "complete fabrication[s]" of "first-person agony
narrative[s]."46 But this is a feeble defense. When someone
gives what purports to be an account of their own life, the
distinction between insider report and "agony narrative" is
unclear at best. How false does a story have to be before
Abrams would consider it a "complete fabrication"? Consider
the recent revelations that key parts of the autobiography of
Nobel Prize winner and multicultural icon Rigoberta Menchu
are untrue. Some in academia have defended Menchu's right
to remain in the multicultural canon on the ground that her
story is an insider account even if not strictly autobiographical,
but this completely erases Abrams' distinction. 47 In any case,
41. Id. at 1651.
42. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1992),
quoted in FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 128.
43. Culp, supra note 3, at 1649.
44. See Abrams, supra note 31, at 1107. Delgado admits that unlike some

critics of radical multiculturalism, we "at least get the quotes right." Delgado,
supra note 3, at 1054.
45. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 98 (quoting Kathryn Abrams,
Hearingthe Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 1025 (1991)).
46. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1106-07. In an earlier article, Abrams
discusses Patricia Williams' story: she has "no reason to doubt that Williams's
narrative... happened in approximately the way she relates," but ultimately
it would make "little difference" if the story had been pure invention.
Abrams, supra note 45, at 1026-27.
47. See Robin Wilson, A Challenge to the Veracity of a Multicultural Icon,
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even granting Abrams' distinction, it remains true that by her
own admission she thinks it is sometimes acceptable for scholars
to make deliberate factual misstatements. We disagree.
Daria Roithmayr is another scholar who comes to the
defense of the radical multiculturalists we quoted, arguing that
we distorted the views of both Stanley Fish and Duncan
Kennedy on merit. They are merely suggesting, she contends,
that current merit standards are racially and ideologically
biased. But whether or not Fish and Kennedy believe-as we
argued and as their language suggests-that all merit standards are essentially power plays, Roithmayr herself apparently
believes precisely that: she says that the true validity of merit
standards is only "measured by whether selection criteria put
people of color immediately into positions of power and
responsibility, 48 and that debates over merit standards should
"become the locus of struggle at the collective level."49
Several critics have charged us with distorting or
misunderstanding Patricia Williams' comments on Tawana
Brawley. 50 Williams originally wrote of the black teenager who
falsely claimed to have been abducted, raped, and tortured by
several white men:
Tawana Brawley has been the victim of some unspeakable crime. No
matter how she got there. No matter who did it to her-and even if
she did it to herself. Her condition was clearly the expression of some
crime against her, some tremendous violence, some great violation
that challenges comprehension. 5'

Williams herself has later elaborated that she meant only that
we should "move beyond whether Brawley lied."52 Frederick

CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 15, 1999, at A14. Wilson says that many
academics plan to continue teaching Menchu's book "because they believe
[heri story speaks to a greater truth about the oppression of poor people."
Wilson quotes a faculty member at Wellesley as saying-. "Whether her book is
true or not, I don't care." Id.; see also Charles Lane, Deceiving Is Believing,
NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 8, 1999, at 36, 38 (Menchu's distorted version of events
effectively silenced the Mayan victims of the struggle between a repressive
regime and violent rebels).
48. Roithmayr, supra note 3, at 1680.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 31, at 1105; Mootz, supra note 2, at 62829. Other commentators read the passage precisely as we do. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 32.
51.

PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 169-70

(1991), quoted in FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 96.
52.

Patricia J. Williams, Through a Glass Darkly, NATION, Jan. 12/19,

1998, at 10.
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Mootz, defending Williams against our interpretation of her,
reads this later statement as confirming that Williams sees the
issue as "what 'truth' the law is willing to hear and is capable
Kathryn Abrams notes that Williams
of confronting."53
"focuses on the fact that the outcome was a foregone conclusion
once the mainstream media and (white) political leaders began
offering their constructions of the case."54 But neither Williams
nor her defenders express even the slightest concern over the
fact that it didn't happen the way Brawley said it did, and that
her devastating accusations against other individuals were
wholly false. Indeed, both Abrams and Mootz seem to hint that
there is still some doubt about whether Brawley's charges were
false, suggesting instead that it is only a question of what our
legal system "wanted" to hear.
Abrams also argues that we missed Williams' point:
Williams is not saying that we would learn "the same thing
from Brawley's story whether it is true or not."55 But even
Abrams concedes that she is "reluctant to identify a determinate meaning in a quote that is more elliptical, and perhaps
more ambiguous, than most in Williams' work."56 If even this
sympathetic reader can't be sure what Williams meant, it is
hardly a "distortion" for us to read "no matter how she got
there" as "it doesn't matter how she got there"--especially
since subsequent writings by both Williams and others refuse
to confront the fact that Brawley lied, instead preferring to
elide the question.
Thus, although there are numerous attempts to disavow or
explain away the obvious meanings of the quotations we use,
these attempts are not very persuasive even when context is
added. This should not be surprising: since one of our main
critiques of the radical multiculturalists was that they are
often indifferent to the accuracy of their statements, we would
have to be either self-destructive or hopelessly inept to allow
pervasive distortions to infect our own work.5 7 Moreover, given

53. Mootz, supra note 2, at 629.
54. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1105 n.28. The gratuitous reference to the
race of the "(white) political leaders" carries an implication that the rejection
of Brawley's story was tainted in some way.
55. Id. at 1105.
56. Id. at 1105 n.27.
57. Culp, at least, seems to think we are inept, claiming that the book
exhibits "little comprehension and no scholarly pretensions," but is merely a
"poorly researched and written diatribe." Culp, supra note 3, at 1640.
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the number of quotations and the range of scholars, all saying
basically the same thing, it would be difficult to avoid
accuracy. Rather than correcting our "distortions," the radicals
are now trying instead to retroactively revamp their core
messages.
2. Responses That Confirm Our Earlier Interpretations
A second problem with the charge of distortion is that some
of the recent responses seem to confirm our interpretations of
the original texts. For example, although John Calmore
attempts to disavow the potential anti-Semitic implications of
the radical critique of merit, his own later language betrays
him by unwittingly underlining those logical implications. In
an article in the Minnesota Law Review in 1997, Calmore
commented on one of the articles that served as a precursor to
Beyond All Reason. Apparently admitting that Jews have
achieved more success than other whites, he suggested that he
"[does] not argue that this access is simply a function of unjust
power-holding." 58 (The italics are his.) Can we conclude that
he believes that at least some Jewish success is the result of
"unjust power-holding"? In this symposium, he also suggests
that we unfairly "discount benign reasons for Jewish success,"
noting that "[c]omplicit involvement in oppression is different
from active support of oppression." 9 Difference there may be,
but Calmore accusing Jews collectively of "complicit involvement in oppression" does not exactly undermine our charge
that radical explanations for Jewish success are bound to have
anti-Semitic implications.
Similarly, Kathryn Abrams, as noted earlier, says that we
distorted her views on the importance of truthfulness in
narratives. Later in her review, however, she defends one of
the tactics that we condemned as illustrative of "the radicals'
casual attitude toward truth."60 We began by noting that there
was nothing wrong with making a statement of the sort "Ifyou,
a male observer, had been there, you probably would not have
seen anything that looked like violence, but I felt exactly as if
Roithmayr similarly suggests that perhaps we "are just not quite able to grasp
the analysis behind the radical argument." Roithmayr, supra note 3, at 1662.
This dismissive attitude is no substitute for a serious analysis of our
arguments.
58. Calmore, Random Notes, supra note 3, at 1468.
59. Calmore, Random Notes-Part2, supra note 3, at 1603 n.51.
60. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 97.
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he had slapped me." We argued, however, that authors should
not consider such a statement equivalent to the simple
declarative "He slapped me"-at least not without warning
readers that the latter sentence does not mean what they think
it does. Abrams argues in her review that using such
statements interchangeably and without warning is warranted: "Sometimes, however, the decision not to identify the
conception of truth that is operating is part of the methodological challenge; the narrative is intended, by its ambiguity,
to challenge readers to see that there are more conceptions of
truth than they are accustomed to thinking."61 Thus, in the
terms in which Beyond All Reason defined truth, Abrams
confirms that she is "not particularly disturbed" by untruthfulness-untruthfulness meaning the deliberate use of factually
inaccurate statements with no indication that a metaphorical
or fictional sense was intended.
Anne Coughlin's contribution to this symposium further
bolsters our diagnosis of the flaws of radical multiculturalism
in a different-and more amusing-way. In Beyond All Reason,
we discussed the pitfalls of storytelling and illustrated them
with a story of our own. As Coughlin points out, our illustration is even better than we intended, since to some extent
we fall unwittingly into one of the very traps we identify.
We presented two personal narratives of the same
historical events, the second designed to show how the first
could be misleading even if factually accurate. Coughlin shows
us that even though we were making a concerted effort to keep
our subjective views out of the second, "deconstructed version"
of the story, those views inevitably crept back in.62 Imagine
how much more the writer's subjective views must dominate in
61. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1122. On this basis, would it be acceptable
for an author to say she was locked out of a shop because of her race, when
she really means only that she felt as unwelcome as if she had been excluded
entirely? If so, what language would a writer have to use to communicate
that she really was locked out?
62. See Anne M. Coughlin, C'est Moi, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1619, 1630-36
(1999). Coughlin's critique is not wholly warranted. While she fairly attacks
the interpretation we place on the historical facts, the main point of the two
stories was to illustrate how personal narratives can mislead the reader as to
the historical facts themselves by omitting critical aspects of the context.
Moreover, Coughlin may be wrong to equate the narrator's refusal to "name
herself a victim" when she might arguably be one, with other narrators'
attempts to portray themselves as victims even if they were not. Id. at 1635.
Victimhood may be a status one can decline, even if one cannot unilaterally
bestow it on oneself.
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a personal narrative that is constructed deliberately to
influence emotion rather than reason, and that is told by
someone who believes that there is no objective version of
historical facts. Coughlin's criticisms of our own use of narrative were fair and accurate, but end up supporting rather than
undermining our basic critique of personal narratives in legal
scholarship. Coughlin's essay itself, moreover, is a wonderful
example of how traditional forms of responsive scholarship,
which carefully dissect arguments to show their flaws, can foster
a dialogue that leads to better understandings all around.
3. The New Meanings Are Meaningless
On a third level, sometimes our critics do restate multiculturalist claims in ways that make them less racist and antiSemitic, but also considerably less radical, if not banal. Culp's
attempt to back away from his disparagement of assimilated
blacks-if it were more successful-would constitute an
example of this. Another example is Roithmayr's objection to
our discussion of Duncan Kennedy's views on merit; she
suggests that his position "appears less zany... in the full
context of the supporting analysis and explanation." 63 We
quoted Kennedy (accurately) as saying that "Wludgments of
merit . . . are inevitably culturally and ideologically contingent."64 What Kennedy really meant, says Roithmayr, is
that standards of merit "are a product of the social conventions
that a particular group or institution finds useful."65 But
without a claim that those social conventions are either
illegitimate or inherently biased-an assertion we still believe
is implicit in Kennedy's full argument-Roithmayr's version of
Kennedy makes a trivial and ultimately inconsequential point.
As John Searle points out, everything about society is socially
constructed in the sense that it could be otherwise, but that by
itself does not call into question the validity of those social
constructs.6 6 What adds punch to the radical view of merit is
the additional argument that all current merit standards are
infected by racial or gender bias.

63.

Roithmayr, supra note 3, at 1663 (quoting Duncan Kennedy, A

CulturalPluralistCase for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE

L.J. 705, 733.
64. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 31.
65. Roithmayr, supra note 3, at 1664.
66. See JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (1995).
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Indeed, Roithmayr herself apparently holds that view, as
she concludes a few pages later that "it becomes difficult if not
impossible to distinguish merit criteria from bias."67 And in an
earlier article, she was even more explicit:
[B]ecause merit depends on and defers to what is in effect a social
bias, merit actually reinscribes the qualities and characteristics of
bias. Indeed, merit can be redescribed as a socially acceptable bias
for particular qualities and characteristics and values. Certainly, the
radical critique of merit builds on this assumption to condemn certain
merit standards as favoring the groups that constructed them."

If this were intended only to mean, say, that medical school
admissions standards exhibit a "bias" towards selecting the
applicants who will be most effective in saving lives, the
radical implications would vanish. It is only the reference to
"favoring the groups that constructed them" that gives this
theory any bite.69
4. Concluding Thoughts on "Distortion"
Thus, in attempting to flee from their own and others'
intemperate statements, radical multiculturalists tend more to
confirm than to deny both the representativeness of our
quotations and the implications of their positions. Moreover,
the whole project of trying to accuse us of distortion on the
basis of admittedly accurate quotations smacks of-Heaven
forbid!-modernism. We thought that for the radicals and
other postmodernists, texts-like actions, which both Calmore
and Culp think can be unintentionally racist-mean what
readers interpret them to mean, and not simply what the
author intended. Do their own texts have an "objectively true"
meaning, which we have distorted?7 0

67. Roithmayr, supra note 3, at 1667.
68. Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and
Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1492-93 (1997).
69. Roithmayr contends, for example, that law school admissions
standards such as the LSAT were originally designed to exclude women and
minorities. See id. at 1486-91. But as many a first-year student has learned
to his or her detriment, reading comprehension and logical thinking-which
make up a substantial portion of the aptitudes tested by the LSAT-are
vitally necessary to legal analysis. (We have recently found that our own
students confront this most sharply when they turn to such tasks as parsing
the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, or understanding the
Rule Against Perpetuities.) Thus, whatever the provenance of the LSAT, it
does seem to identify some skills that are especially useful in law school.
70. Interestingly, the radicals' rather casual view of linguistic precision
might extend to our writing as well as theirs. At least one critic believes that
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Finally, no one suggests that we have actually misquoted
any of the radical multiculturalists. If these accurate quotations
do not in fact mean what they appear to mean, the authors must
have had a remarkably tin ear for language. If so, this itself
has adverse implications for important parts of their program.
Radical multiculturalists are exceptionally willing to impose
discipline on students or faculty based on their own understanding of language that may be. ambiguous or unfamiliar. If
the term "white men in black face" is not really pejorative, then
what about the "hate speech" charges brought against a student
for using the translated Hebrew term "water buffalo"? 1 Who
decides what is "really" pejorative? Are these the people we
want creating and implementing campus speech codes?
H. DANCING AROUND THE "JEWISH QUESTION"

A. RADICAL MULTICULTuRALSM'S JEWISH DILEMMA
One of the most controversial aspects of Beyond All Reason
has been the topic of anti-Semitism. Unfortunately, even some
readers who are otherwise sympathetic with our project have
misunderstood our purpose in this instance. One reviewer
suggests that we were "a little overeager to claim the coveted
status of victim,"7 2 while another accused us of engaging in

we can't possibly mean what we say. Roithmayr writes:
Farber and Sherry cannot really mean that nothing of knowledge
value is contributed when Patricia Williams points out, in a voice
that betrays her personal anger and frustration, that as of 1991
Harvard had yet to hire permanently a woman of color for a tenuretrack position.
Roithmayr, supra note 3, at 1672.
Well, actually, we do mean that. We knew before Williams wrote that
that the Harvard Law School had no women of color on its faculty. Have we
learned anything useful when we are told that this fact frustrates a
prominent black female academic-at the time teaching at the University of
Wisconsin Law School-who might herself have ambitions to greater things?
We've learned about as much when Culp charges that Richard Posner ignores
"important" scholarship by people of color-and then includes his own work in
the list of slighted important scholarship. Culp, supra note 3, at 1659, 1661,
1670.
71. For a description of an incident involving the latter term, see Finkin,
supra note 29, at 1702-03 & n.85.
72. Marc M. Arkin, Radical Moderation, NEW CRITERION, May 1998, at
65, 67. The same reviewer, incidentally, says that the most serious flaw in the
book is that it is "too moderate, that it makes too much of an effort to meet its
subject more than halfway." Id. at 690.
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"identity politics." 73 Judge Posner, too, suggests that we should
not have "played the Jewish victim card."74 Other reviewers
interpret the argument as consequentialist-that is, as a
prediction that radical multiculturalism will foster hostility
toward Jews. For example, Mootz says there would be "a
sufficient starting point" for our argument "[i]f there will in fact
be a tendency to paint Jews and Asians as social manipulators
once the objectivity of the criteria of merit are undermined." 75
Still, he says, we do not provide "even one convincing example"
of this risk materializing. 76
In retrospect, these misunderstandings may have been
inevitable. At points, we clearly did raise consequentialist
concerns in the book. In assessing the significance of the antiSemitism argument, we suggested that, though the antiSemitic implications "are unintended and don't pose any
immediate risk of harm, the long history of anti-Semitism
makes it difficult to be completely sanguine about the lack of
any danger."77 We also noted the problem that the critique of
merit poses for women and minorities who succeed in today's
society: "If merit is a white male construct, then a black who
succeeds can only have done so at the cost of some sacrifice of
her authentic culture in favor of the oppressor's."7 8
But despite these consequentialist observations, our
primary purpose was not to address these potential practical
effects of radical multiculturalism. Instead, as we explained at
the beginning of the chapter in question, our purpose was to
demonstrate that radical multiculturalism cannot "provide a

73. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1111, 1113 n.38; see also Levit, supra note
3, at 807-08 (describing the "structure of [our] argument" as perspectivist
because it asks "Is this theory good for the Jews?"); Deborah C. Malamud, The
Jew Taboo: Jewish Difference and the Affirmative Action Debate, 59 OHIO ST.
L.J. 915, 917 (1998) (accusing us of speaking "as Jews" and "claiming a
privileged Jewish perspective").
74. Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at
40, 43.
75. Mootz, supra note 2, at 629; see also Abrams, supra note 31, at 1099
("Farber and Sherry propose to assess multicultural scholarship in a purely
consequentialist manner-according to the world it is likely to create.");
Steven G. Gey, Why Rubbish Matters: The Neoconservative Underpinningsof
Social ConstructionistTheory, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1707, 1708 (1999) (describing
ours as a "consequentialist approach" although not criticizing it).
76. Mootz, supra note 2, at 629 n.95.
77. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 139.
78. Id. at 140.
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viable conception of equality."79 In short, in using the Jewish
example, we were hoping to expose deep conceptual flaws in
radical multiculturalism, rather than heading off worrisome
practical impacts on a particular group. As we emphasized,
much the same argument applies to some groups of AsianAmericans-which many of our critics conveniently forget
when they accuse us of playing identity politics.
Given these various misunderstandings of the thrust of
our argument, it may be useful to restate our argument briefly.
The radical critique of merit is designed to show that merit is
socially constructed. Rather than serving in any way as an
objective measure of value, "merit" is simply a societal norm
that favors certain powerful groups and keeps others down.
Thus, the relative position of groups or individuals cannot be
defended even in part by arguing that some groups have
behaviors or cultural attitudes that are genuinely more
functional. The writings of radical multiculturalists such as
Richard Delgado, Duncan Kennedy, Catharine MacKinnon,
and Patricia Williams are replete with statements to this
effect.8 0 But if this position is correct, the success of groups
such as Jews and Asians relative to the majority poses an
intractable puzzle: "If Asians and Jews are more successful
than white Gentiles, and if standards of merit are socially
constructed to maintain the positions of the powerful and
successful, then .... " (Well, you can fill in the rest.) We then
explored some possible escapes from this logic. Some are
substantively plausible, for example, that Jews and Asians
benefit from cultural attitudes that put an unusual stress on
the importance of education, which is a valuable trait in a postindustrial society. But accepting such a benign explanation
would destroy the rhetorical force of the radical critique of
merit by admitting that at least some aspects of group success
or failure may be due to the group's own cultural attributes,
which may be genuinely functional or dysfunctional in today's
post-industrial society.
Our thesis, in short, was that the Jewish situation
presents an unresolvable dilemma for radical multiculturalists.
Jewish success violates the simplistic picture in which success
is merely a function of social power, fairness consists of

79. Id. at 52.
80. We collect many of these statements in FARBER & SHERRY, supra note
1, at 31-32. We discuss the charge of distortion more fully in Part I, supra.
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proportionate results, and norms such as merit or racial
equality are merely fronts for group self-interest.
Our critics react to this charge in three distinct ways.
First, some claim that radical multiculturalism should not be
expected to explain Jewish success. Others try to explain away
some of the discomfort that arises from the radicals' treatment
of the Jewish question by changing the rules of engagement.
Finally, a few commentators have attempted to find other
benign explanations for Jewish success that are nevertheless
compatible with radical multiculturalism. In the next section,
we discuss each of these responses.
B. DODGING THE DILEMMA
1.

"No Explanation Is Necessary"

The simplest way to avoid an intractable intellectual
dilemma is simply to refuse to think about it. Several of our
critics have advocated this defense. Richard Delgado, for
example, thinks it is "odd" to expect radical multiculturalists to
"have at the ready a complete explanation for the wholly
commendable success some Jews have enjoyed in education
and the professions." 81 Similarly, Kathryn Abrams chides us
for raising the question: "Why those who propose to change a
particular social arrangement should be required to explainwith or without recourse to stereotypes-the prominent
position of any one group within that arrangement is a
question Farber and Sherry never answer." 2 Of course, both

comments would be well-taken if the radical multiculturalists

were simply ordinary reformers, proposing specific social
changes. But radical multiculturalists are claiming to be
scholars, not just politicians; rather than offering incremental
reform, they purport to have a general social critique. An intellectually serious critique of society cannot simply refuse to
confront inconvenient but highly visible counterexamples.
An analogy may be helpful. Consider a novel economic
theory that posits a radically different set of assumptions than
conventional economics. It turns out, however, that this theory
is completely unable to account for the Great Depression. This
is clearly a flaw, and one that ought to be addressed by the

81. Delgado, supra note 3, at 1062.
82. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1113 n.39.
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theorists. If we think that severe economic depressions (or, in
our case, anti-Semitism) are wholly a thing of the past, the
need to address the problem may not seem urgent for theorists.
But of course, we cannot be wholly confident of such
predictions. In addition, although the Great Depression is an
extreme case, a theory that is wholly unable to address that
extreme case is also likely to run into problems with ordinary
recessions.
Similarly, the inability of the radical multiculturalists to account for Jewish success dramatizes their
inability to make sense of ongoing phenomena such as the
growing success of Asian groups and that of individual women,
blacks, and Hispanics. Thus, while it is understandable that
the anti-Semitism issue might not seem highly salient to
radical multiculturalists, it does reveal important intellectual
gaps in their theory, just as the Great Depression does for our
hypothetical economic theory. Having a social theory that
explains minority failure but not minority success is like
having an economic theory that can explain inflation but not
recessions.
2. "What Anti-Semitism?"
In practice, radical multiculturalists often avoid confronting the problem of their inability to explain Jewish success.
But it's not surprising that, from time to time, a perceptive
radical multiculturalist might touch on the problem before
moving away in discomfort. If, as we think, the situation of
American Jews and Asians is incompatible with the simplistic
worldview of radical multiculturalism, we should not be
surprised to find signs of the resulting intellectual anxieties in
multiculturalist writings. We provided several such examples
from the writings of Derrick Bell. Bell has insightfully realized
that Jews are an anomaly from the point of view of his
theories, and he repeatedly goes out of his way to raise the
issue:
Space Traders. Illustrating Bell's view that only white
self-interest, rather than any concern for justice, matters in
race law, he tells a story about an alien encounter in which
space traders offer Americans untold riches in return for
custody of the black population. Jews form an "Anne Frank"
committee 83 to resist-an action that, like historic Jewish
83. As Judge Kozinski points out, it seems particularly insensitive for
Bell to make "the symbol of Jewish hypocrisy the little girl who perished in
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support for civil rights, poses a threat to Bell's thesis of pure
white self-interest. But the problem is only superficial, it turns
out, since many of the Jews care nothing about racial justice
and are merely trying to keep blacks around as a buffer
between themselves and the white Christian majority.8 4
Faculty Hiring. In discussing hiring standards at Harvard,
Bell argues that merit standards have little relationship to
teaching or scholarship. He observes that these standards
"now favor" Jewish faculty members, who are disproportionately represented, but this does not make them "any less
discriminatory to others" who are disadvantaged by the
standards, including not only racial minorities but other white
ethnic groups.8 5
Anti-Semitism. Unlike racism, which Bell defines broadly,
he considers anti-Semitism to be a very narrow concept: "[N]ot
every negative comment about Jews-even if it is wrong-is
anti-Semitic." (Note, by the way, the "even if' clause, which
hints that some disparagement of Jews is accurate.) Although
anti-Semitism is wrong, Bell says, figures like Farrakhan
deserve support: The travails of the black underclass "place[ I
them beyond.., even the civilities of racial and religious
86
tolerance."
Bell's comments were obviously not intentionally antiSemitic, but we suggested that they were symptomatic of the
deeper conflicts hidden beneath the surface of radical multiculturalism. The real problem is not that Bell is personally
insensitive to Jewish concerns. Bell is simply more perceptive
than some of his colleagues in seeing that Jews pose a serious
problem for radical multiculturalist theory, and that
perception finds an outlet in these rather jarring stories.
Several radicals try to avoid recognizing Bell's stories as
symptomatic by adamantly denying that they have even the
faintest anti-Semitic overtones. But in doing so, they change
their own rules of social and linguistic analysis.
For example, in his contribution to this symposium,
Jerome McCristal Culp stresses that Bell's Space Tradersstory
only says that "many," not "all," Jews are motivated by self-

the Holocaust." Alex Kozinski, Bending the Law, N.Y. TIMS, Nov. 2, 1997,
§ 7, at 2.
84. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 4.
85. Id. at 58.
86. Id. at 44.
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interest in their purportedly altruistic actions. The moral of
the story, he says, is that Jews are right to think they will be
the next victims. 87 Similarly, Kathryn Abrams admits that the
Space Traders story "is not a flattering picture of Jews," but
she points out that they are also portrayed as victims in the
story. She does seem troubled by the story, however: "One can
question why Jews, via this subplot, were held up for
particular criticism at all." 88 Still, she says, "[w]hile the picture
of Jews it presents is not pretty, Jews do not fare conspicuously
less well than any other group in this nightmarish account," so
the story does not "provide a basis for charging Bell with anti89
Semitism.
Both Culp and Abrams also defend Bell's comments about
Farrakhan. Although Culp disagrees with Bell's approval of
Farrakhan, he says that Bell explains his position "in terms
that are clearly not anti-Semitic"-namely, that some of
Farrakhan's statements have been taken out of context, and
that whites do not have the right to make explicit
condemnation of Farrakhan a precondition for political respectability.90 Abrams says that "[wihile some of Bell's discussion
may be jarring to some Jewish sensibilities"--including, she
says, her own-to call the discussion anti-Semitic "seems
incorrect and inflammatory" since Bell's overall discussion of
Farrakhan is "complicated."91
Notably, the arguments made in defending Bell are
completely outside the normal framework of radical multiculturalism; suddenly, Bell's defenders switch to the same
entirely conventional analysis that the ACLU would use if it
were defending Bell against the charge that his stories violated
a campus speech code. In discussing Bell, Abrams and Culp
87.

See Culp, supra note 3, at 1646.

88. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1109-10 n.36.
89. Id.
90. Culp, supra note 3, at 1647.
91. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1109 n.36. These are all fair points.
Indeed, if we had called Bell anti-Semitic, these would be convincing
rebuttals. But in fact, we did not make this charge. What we actually did say
was the following
It would be convenient if we could simply condemn Bell's lapses as
symptoms of an insensitivity to anti-Semitism. Unfortunately, we
believe the problem is deeper. Bell's difficulty with the Jewish
question is no aberration. Instead, it is a corollary of his widely
shared theory that standards of merit are socially constructed to
favor the powerful.
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 4.

1999]

BEYOND ALL CRITICISM?

1757

abandon all of the standard conceptual apparatus of radical
multiculturalism. There is no talk here of deep social structures,
ingrained cultural attitudes, mindsets, or unconscious biases.
Ironically, Bell's defenders here combine a narrowly literalistic
textualism with a view of discrimination as limited to
of the
conscious malignant intent-both hallmarks
in
Consider,
Scalia.
Justice
of
conservative jurisprudence
sexism:
and
racism
of
view
expansive
contrast, Abrams'
"multiculturalism has sought to evoke racism and sexism as
varied, socially constructed phenomena that are far more
difficult to avoid than intentional discrimination."92 She says
she is troubled by the fact that critiques of narrative, including
our own, may unintentionally mirror traditional methods of
marginalizing or discrediting women and people of color: "I do
not contend that critics of narrative act on the basis of these
93
assumptions. The problem is not their intent but the result."
All of this subtle social theory goes out the window, however,
when remarks are targeted at Jews rather than at blacks or
women.
To highlight the significance of this drastic change in
methodology, consider the response if the speaker had been
Richard Posner rather than Derrick Bell. Although Culp goes
to great lengths to exculpate Bell, he finds it easy to pass
judgment on Posner simply for committing the "racist act" of
94
ignoring the good scholarship of critical race theorists.
Suppose, in addition, that Posner had given an elaborate
hypothetical in which blacks formed a Martin Luther King
society for purportedly altruistic (but actually selfish) reasons;
that he had enthusiastically defended David Duke as a
spokesman for lower class Southern whites while at the same
92. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1126. In a footnote, Abrams suggests that
various "isms" might be defined differently, "depending on their virulence,
history, and the social position of their targets in a particular society." Id. at
1126 n.66. The suggestion seems to be that anti-Semitism is simply not very
serious in American society, as compared with racism, so it should be defined
narrowly. But this is utterly circular. Until we define something, how can we
assess its seriousness as a social problem? Moreover, the implications seem
odd: under Abrams' approach, Bell's book might be wholly commendable in
the United States but blatantly anti-Semitic if reprinted in a country-such as
Russia-with a more pervasive and longstanding problem with anti-Semitism
and few blacks.
93. Id. at 1125.
94. Culp, supra note 3, at 1659. Ca]more also calls Posner's negative
assessment of critical race theory "goofy." Calmore, Random Notes-Part2,
supra note 3, at 1612.
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time explicitly refusing to denounce Duke's racism; and that he
had argued that ill-conceived standards had allowed blacks to
attain disproportionate success in certain walks of life. Now
imagine that a defender of Posner's had made arguments akin
to those that Culp and Abrams make in favor of Bell: that the
(hypothetical) Posner statements are offensive to many blacks
but not really racist; that he merely said that most blacks
rather than all blacks were self-serving; that Posner thinks
everyone is self-serving anyway so that his mention of blacks
does not prove bias; and so forth. Would Culp, or Bell, or any
other multiculturalist, find these plausible excuses?
The anxiety to avoid confronting Bell's statements is due
to more, we think, than an understandably protective impulse
toward a respected senior colleague. Bell's comments highlight
the underlying conflict between radical multiculturalism and
Jewish success in America. Rather than confronting the
problem, Culp and Abrams prefer to switch methodologies,
avoid the structural implications of Bell's position (and theirs),
and instead focus on questions of personal intent. It is always
a bad sign for a theory when adverse evidence is dealt with by
jettisoning the basic methods of the theory.
3. Benign Explanations of Jewish Success
Other critics have responded to the anti-Semitism issue by
trying to account for the position held by Jews in society on
some acceptable terms. These attempts have been remarkably
unsuccessful, if not backhanded. Consider Calmore's comments, which we briefly mentioned earlier. Calmore suggests
that "Jews in America have sought and largely attained whiteskin Privilege, a Privilege that advantageously sets the stage
for their continued success and achievement as individuals.95
He elaborates on this theme in his symposium contribution,
suggesting that this constitutes a benign reason for Jewish
success: "A beneficiary of white Privilege is not necessarily evil.
Complicit involvement in oppression is different from active
support of oppression."96 So now we have the "benign" answer
to the problem of Jewish success, it would seem: Jews are just
better than other whites in the "advantageous" enterprise of
being complicitly involved in oppression.

95. Calmore, Random Notes, supra note 3, at 1467.
96. Calmore, Random Notes-Part2, supra note 3, at 1603 n.51.
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Other efforts to avoid our argument seem equally unavailing. Deborah Malamud, rejecting the idea that any aspects of
Jewish culture might have contributed to success in American
society,97 is forced to concoct an implausibly reductionist
historical theory. The story she tells is this: Jews arrived in
America primed with urban survival skills and occupational
abilities such as tailoring, which stood them in good stead in
industry and paved their way to move into small business. As
a result, they were better able to keep their children in school
rather than sending them to work, which proved fortunate
when the G.I. Bill came along and allowed these high school
graduates to pursue higher education, just in time to move into
the professions in the post-war era. 98 As Malamud concedes,
the best social science work in the field indicates that her
theory is only a partial explanation of Jewish success. 99 On its
face, moreover, it fails to account for some of the most dramatic
evidence. For instance, by 1970, Jews made up almost forty
Is the
percent of the faculty at "elite" law schools. 100
explanation supposed to be that twenty years earlier they also
made up forty percent of those who went to college on the G.I.
bill? When a scholar as astute as Malamud finds it necessary
to resort to such strained reductionist explanations, something
is obviously amiss.101
As in the book itself, our purpose here is not to explain the
relative success of Jews in American society, let alone to
explain the lack of success of other groups. We do not claim to
be sociologists any more than we claim to be professional
philosophers. We do think it clear, however, that the kinds of
social theories propounded by radical multiculturalists are
grossly inadequate to explain the current positions of Jews and
Asian-Americans. At heart, we believe, the radical multiculturalists and their supporters know exactly the same thing.
But, as their responses to Beyond All Reason make clear, they
are not quite yet at the point of acknowledging the flaws in
their reductionist social theories. Faced with a compelling
counterexample, radical multiculturalists are reduced to the
97. See Malamud, supra note 73, at 923-38.
98. See id. at 967-68.
99. See id. at 968.
100. See

FARBER

& SHERRY, supra note 1, at 58.

101. Another effort to explain the problem is made in Roithmayr, supra
note 3, at 1669. As Matthew Finkin explains, however, this explanation is
equally unavailing. See Finkin, supra note 29, at 1690-91 & n.31.
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usual last efforts to save a failed paradigm by ignoring adverse
evidence or rationalizing it away. To the extent that these
defense mechanisms indicate a growing discomfort with the
underlying theories, however, we believe that they are a
hopeful sign of a potential breakthrough.
III. THE REGRESSIVE SIDE OF A "PROGRESSIVE"
MOVEMENT
The difficulty of extracting any workable conception of
social equality from radical multiculturalism is a sign of a
larger set of problems. We argued in Beyond All Reason that
radical multiculturalism is inherently destructive of dialogue
and community. Among the problems are its tendency to
reduce argument to the exchange and criticism of personal
stories; its inability to separate disagreement with a speaker's
message from attacks on the speaker as a person; and its
divisive entanglement in identity politics. Because radical
multiculturalism replaces a belief in objective truth with a
focus on power relations, it faces the temptation to slide away
from democratic interchange toward nihilism or authoritarianism. Anne Coughlin summarizes (and partially endorses) our
argument in the following passage:
Throughout the book, Farber and Sherry repeatedly fault the radicals
for politicizing scholarship, for confusing politics with truth, and for
rejecting universal values in favor of an intellectual totalitarianism
that privileges the subjective preferences of whoever happens to be in
power. Indeed, as Farber and Sherry notice, some of the more
extreme statements by the radical multiculturalists amount to an
endorsement of the ugliest kind of fascism... . These criticisms are
obvious, devastating, and, from the perspective of traditional liberal
scholars, largely unanswerable.'°2

In their contributions to this symposium, Matthew Finkin
and Steven Gey expand upon the potentially antidemocratic
implications of radical multiculturalism. Finkin draws a
detailed and rather worrisome comparison between radical
multiculturalism and the jurisprudential principles accepted in
certain European fascist regimes. Indeed, he goes farther. He
offers the hypothesis "[tihat radical multiculturalism has more
than an 'affinity' with Fascism; that it is Fascist to the bone." 103
Gey argues that radical multiculturalism leads to an
essentially conservative politics: "since the social construction.102.

Coughlin, supra note 62, at 1621.
103. Finkin, supra note 29, at 1700.
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ists refuse to recognize the legitimacy of liberal institutional
limits on political power, they implicitly give every group that
obtains ultimate power the authority to impose that group's
'truth' on everyone else."10 4 In various ways, and sometimes in
language much more pointed than our own, Finkin, Gey, and
Coughlin all raise the question of whether the hard-won
virtues of a liberal society are compatible with a serious
adherence to radical multiculturalism.
As Coughlin points out, much of the attention of the
radical multiculturalists is focused on the academic world in
which they live and work. We might begin, then, by asking
whether their viewpoint is consistent with the values of
intellectual and academic freedom that are central to the
classical liberal vision of the university. The traditional
arguments for academic freedom are based on the notion of
searching for truth, a concept that is made problematic by post105
modernism.
Some criticisms of Beyond All Reason also suggest an
intolerance for academic debate. The most obvious concern is
raised by the intemperate response of radicals such as Calmore
and Culp to any criticism of their school of thought. Such
views, if held either by individuals with influence within
universities or by administrators of speech codes, would pose a
direct threat to free debate. Charges of racism, when issuing
from those who advocate legal penalties against racist
speakers, are not just empty rhetoric.
In addition to the openly vituperative replies, some of the
responses illustrate the attitude we criticized in Derrick Bell as
a "knowing and dismissive sneer."1 06 Calmore, for example,

104. Gey, supra note 75, at 1729-30.
105. See David M. Rabban, CanAcademic Freedom Survive Postmodernism?,
86 CAL. L. REV. 1377, 1378 (1998).
106. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 88 (quoting DAPHNE PATAI &
NORETA KOERTGE, PROFESSING FEMINISM: CAUTIONARY TALES FROM THE
Frederick Mootz,
STRANGE WORLD OF WOMEN'S STUDIES 118 (1994)).
although he is critical of our work on other grounds, agrees with us here:
[Any tendency by the radicals to be dismissive toward traditional
scholars who lack access to the unique voice available only to
minority radicals certainly would be disappointing.... Dismissive
refusals to engage others in dialogue by remaining silent or launching
attacks, especially when issued from the loftiest heights in academia,
represent the worst forms of pseudo-objectivism that the radicals
profess to eradicate.
Mootz, supra note 2, at 634.
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suggests that our book "should really be buried"107 rather than
discussed. Culp says that "[tihe philosophical ideas expressed
in this book. . . are to philosophy what lite is to beer."108
Continuing Bell's reference to Louis Armstrong-if you don't
know jazz, "don't mess with it"'o9 -Calmore engages in an
extended discussion of jazz and his ambivalence about its
appeal to a broad audience, concluding that "[ilt really is okay
that Farber and Sherry are not happily within [the] audience"
for radical multiculturalism.1 10 These shrugs of disdain do not
exactly invite dialogue.
But the more significant point is not the defensive tone of
the radicals, but their distorted picture of intellectual
discourse. For instance, Abrams calls for a "truce" in which
traditional scholars and radical multiculturalists will learn to
live side by side.'
This turns out to be a rather one-sided
truce, however. Traditional scholars, according to Abrams,
should not "challenge" multiculturalists by asking about the
truth or normative implications of their narratives,"i2 but
radical multiculturalists are free to accuse traditionalists of
racism and sexism whenever they think it appropriate. 1 3 For
Delgado, scholarship is equivalent to a lawsuit (or political
warfare), where each side is trying to win: thus it is unfair to
write a favorable review of a scholar in the "same camp" or on
your "side" unless you disclose your common affiliation." 4 This
is a somewhat peculiar vision of academic discussion.
More generally, at least some radical multiculturalists feel
alienated from the democratic process. For instance, Culp
criticizes what he calls the "majority rules hypothesis," which
he says that most other critical race theorists also reject. He
argues that radical social change will be extremely difficult if
those who seek change must first persuade the majority that
the status quo is unjust. Hence, he rejects the hypothesis that
"to be reasonable you must always speak to persuade the

107. Calmore, Random Notes-Part2, supra note 3, at 1591.
108. Culp, supra note 3, at 1640.
109. Derrick A. Bell, Who's Afraid of CriticalRace Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L.
REV. 893, 910, quoted in FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 88.
110. Calmore, Random Notes-Part2, supra note 3, at 1616.
111. Abrams, supra note 31, at 1118.
112. Id. at 1120-21.
113. See id. at 1125-26.
114. See Delgado, supra note 3, at 1065.
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majority."11 5 He thus echoes Bell's observation, in connection
with a discussion of the Space Traders story, that when they
sought a national referendum to ratify the expulsion of the
black population, national leaders were "aware as well of the
likely outcome when the civil rights of a minority group are
submitted to a popular vote." 116 The assumption, of course, is
that the "likely outcome" of majority rule is the destruction of
minority rights. 17 Naturally, democratic institutions have
little intrinsic value from this perspective.
This estrangement from democratic ideals is illustrated in
Roithmayr's review of Beyond All Reason. As we noted earlier,
she considers fundamental questions about standards of merit
to be beyond rational decision, and instead grounded only in
"contingent political commitments, affiliations or worldviews,"
which are themselves "the locus of struggle at the collective
level."" 8 What does this collective struggle entail? Roithmayr
rejects what she views as Richard Rorty's undesirable reliance
on "free and open encounters" as a means of changing
viewpoints. She contrasts Rorty unfavorably with "radical
theorists like Ernesto Laclau [who] point out that consensus
will only form when one group is able to exercise power over
other groups."'19 Her view, she says, does not depend either on
"Farber and Sherry's universal reason or Rorty's undistorted,
empathetic conversation to promote the interests of the
disenfranchised." Instead, her version of "[r]adical pragmatist
method takes its direction more from Laclau's vision of the
exercise of political power."' 20 Of course, she goes on to add,
the struggle can take several forms, including the use of
conventional legal arguments, depending on circumstances.

115. Culp, supra note 3, at 1668.
116. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., California's Proposition 209: A Temporary
Diversion on the Road to Racial Disaster, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1447, 1448
(1997). The moral of the story, Bell says, is "both simple and irrefutable: This
society is always willing to sacrifice the rights of black people to protect or
further important economic or political interests." Indeed, he adds, racial
injustices are only remedied when "such remedies further interests
importance to whites, or some of them." Id. at 1449.
117. We do not claim that majority rule is a sufficient safeguard
minority rights. But the idea that majorities are universally hostile
minority rights is equally unsupportable. Consider, for example, the bevy
civil rights statutes passed since 1964.
118. Roithmayr, supra note 3, at 1680.
119. Id. at 1681.
120. Id. at 1682.
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But it all depends on circumstances: "Radical scholars should
decide whether, in a particular local context, political commitments towards including outsiders might be better advanced
through revolutionary social rupture-when it might be useful
to dispense wholesale with conventional ways of thinking-or
whether a more progressive or conservative approach might
better serve radical aims." 121 In this analysis, the goal of both
politics and scholarship is to advance the interests of
particular groups, by any means necessary; efforts at reasonable persuasion are only one tool among many. This augurs
poorly for both scholarship and democracy.
The radicals' discomfort with democracy is linked to their
skepticism about the Enlightenment principles that underlie
modern liberal democracy 2 2 Indeed, one defender of radical
multiculturalism takes us to task for relying unquestioningly
on "the cornerstones of the Enlightenment tradition of liberal
political thought," which he describes as "equal treatment of all
citizens, robust public dialogue leading to increasingly deeper
understanding, and evolutionary improvements fostered by the
development of accurate historical understanding."' 23 But, he
says, the whole project of radical multiculturalism is to
challenge these principles. 124 Is there a future, one wonders,
for a movement that rejects the norms of equal citizenship,
robust public dialogue, and historical truth? Is it a future that
we-or even the radical multiculturalists themselves-would
really want to live in?
Thus, the further writings of radical multiculturalists
since the publication of Beyond All Reason lend credence to the
concerns voiced by Gey and Finkin. There are indeed strains of
radical multiculturalism that are at odds with free debate,
critical thought, majority rule, and other aspects of liberal
democracy. But it may be a mistake to read too much into
radical multiculturalist discussions of these issues. Although
there may be unhealthy authoritarian tinges in radical
multiculturalism, the radical multiculturalists are far from
having articulated or endorsed a clear-cut rejection of liberal
democracy. We have not given up hope that critical race
121. Id. at 1683.
122. For expressions of such skepticism since publication of Beyond All
Reason, see, for example, Calmore, Random Notes-Part2, supra note 3, at
1595-96, and Delgado, supra note 3, at 1069.
123. Mootz, supranote 2, at 616.
124. See id.
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theorists, radical feminists, and critical legal scholars
generally will turn away from this destructive path. Around
the world, people have fought too hard for liberal democratic
institutions. The notion that we are better off to celebrate
"collective struggle" rather than democratic dialogue is an
anachronism that cannot survive forever even in the rarefied
atmosphere of the faculty lounge.
Besides being undemocratic, the picture of social change
provided by radical multiculturalists is highly unrealistic. If
all that counts is the ability to tell persuasive stories, to
manipulate mindsets and emotions, and to exercise social
power, the Left doesn't have a chance. It is the Establishment,
after all, that controls the schools, the media, the prisons, the
police, the army, and the economy. If the Left doesn't have
reason on its side, it has nothing.
CONCLUSION
What of the future of radical multiculturalism? Those
radical multiculturalists who have discussed the book in print
seem largely unwilling, at least so far, to engage our ideas
seriously on the merits. But it may be a mistake to attach too
much importance to this initial defensive reaction. Radical
multiculturalists have until now had little experience with
outside criticism, and perhaps it is not surprising that the first
reaction should be anger rather than deliberation. Over time,
perhaps radical multiculturalists will come to realize, as Judge
Posner puts it, that "[c]riticism is the oxygen of a scholarly
movement."125
In any event, this may be a propitious time for the radical
multiculturalists to rethink their views. Richard Delgado and
Jean Stefancic have recently observed that critical race theory
is in a state of some disarray, with much energy wasted on
fighting against liberalism at a time when the truly powerful
political forces threatening minorities are themselves antiliberal.126 Perhaps a growing awareness of political and social
realities will permeate the movement, leading to a more
rigorous conceptual framework. That, at least, is our hope.127

125. Posner, supranote 74, at 43.
126. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: Past,
Present, and Future, 51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 467, 490-91 (M.D.A.
Freeman ed., 1998).
127. Admittedly, as Arthur Austin suggests, this forecast may be too.

1766

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1735

As a counterweight to the forces on the Right, what we need
from the Left is something more than the tired slogans of
fading French philosophers, nostalgia for the glories of the
sixties, or fragments of autobiographical anecdotes.

optimistic. See ARTHUR AUSTIN, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACIc: OUTSIDERS AND
THE STRUGGLE OVER LEGAL EDUCATION 199-200 (1998).

